

# TAKING DATA OUT OF CONTEXT TO HYPER-PERSONALIZE ADS: Crowdworkers' Privacy Perceptions And Decisions To Disclose Private Information

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\* co-lead authors


 May 2020



Northwestern







People can find personalized ads **creepy**

Personalization reflects potential **misuse of data**:  
data collected in one context, but **re-used** in another

1. How would you respond to seeing your **data re-contextualized** in a **hyper-targeted ad**?
2. How could you **prevent unwanted reuse** of your data in the future?

One strategy: **limit information disclosure**

Would seeing a **creepy, hyper-personalized ad...**

→ ...cause feelings of privacy invasion?


→ ...alter information disclosure behavior?

Our experiment:

1. Show either a **generic ad** or **hyper-personalized ad**
2. Ask invasive questions (with an option not to answer)

# METHODS

# Deception protocol





# Deception protocol

**Study Title:**

~~The Impact of Hyper-Personalized Marketing on Information Disclosure~~

**Affiliation:**




# Part 1

## 1. Obtain consent

## 2. Gather information **without arousing suspicion**

distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor  
distractor **first name** distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor  
distractor distractor distractor **phone number** distractor distractor  
distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor **preferred cuisine**  
distractor **relationship status** distractor distractor distractor distractor  
distractor distractor distractor distractor distractor **partner's name**  
**+ location**


# Deception protocol





**Banner**

or



**Robotext**

first name

partner's  
name

Taylor, treat Ryan  
to a date night this week  
in Memphis.

location

We know you LOVE Thai restaurants.  
Use SUPEReats.co to reserve a table at one of  
the 7 near you for a deal!

preferred  
cuisine



[www.SUPEREATS.co](http://www.SUPEREATS.co)

## Banner ads




Personalized




Generic

# Robotext ads

Personalized



Generic



# Study conditions



**Banner**



**Personalized    Generic**



**Robotext**




**Personalized    Generic**



# Deception protocol



# Invasive questions



COSMOPOLITAN



series of 43 invasive questions

# Invasive questions

How many years of experience do you have with using the Internet?

For what reason did you last cry?

What is the first and last name of your best friend?

What is your home address?

## “Prefer not to say” option

What is your home address?



Prefer not to say

Explicitly told **no penalty** for selecting ‘Prefer not to say’

# Debrief

**We revealed:**

**not IIDR, but the University of Chicago  
we had sent the banner or robotext ad**

## Following debrief

We asked:

do you remember seeing the ad?

did you suspect it was study related at any point?

what factors did you consider when answering?

did you answer any questions **inaccurately**? (no penalty)

# Participant privacy and ethics

**Used Prolific's deception filter**

**Prolific approved our study design**

**Debriefed participants who dropped out**

**Deleted PII and answers to invasive questions**

# RESULTS



## Deception effectiveness



92  
(65%)

read robotext and not suspicious



85  
(62%)

saw banner ad and not suspicious

## Reactions to ad



reported feeling scared, concerned, shocked or surprised, creeped out, or uncomfortable

**53%**

*Personalized  
Banner*

**44%**

*Personalized  
Robotext*

**0%**

*Generic Banner  
Generic Robotext*

## Reactions to ad



creeped out



determine  
data origin

"I had a noticeable reaction of both worry and disgust, and then I knew my spouse's name and my location. I was disturbed and put off by it." (P423, Robbertext Personalized)

# Information disclosure

Answered

Accurate

How many years of experience do you have with using the Internet?

100%

100%

For what reason did you last cry?

86%

86%

What is the first and last name of your closest friend?

41%


36%

What is your home address?

15%

14%

# Information disclosure by condition



## Part 2: Why select prefer not to say?



personal or  
embarrassing (42%)

“I selected prefer not to say when I thought it **crossed the line** into my privacy.” (P47, Banner-Generic)



personally-  
identifying or  
security-related  
(36%)

“...Questions that felt like phishing (mom's maiden name) were a no-go. I cared less about it being invasive and more about it **being bad security.**” (P156, Banner-Generic)

# Information disclosure factors



lack of time/effort



compensation



privacy calculus

“It’s **impossible to really know** where the data goes after you leave this. VMOX is **unrestricted territory** but the **fact is, get complicated** wouldn’t be doing this. **app53, Robotext** part it’s **making an effort** to try and **personalized** takes all day so does amazon, so do so many others. I don’t get paid for that.” (P207, Robotext-  
Generic)

# Crowdworking and trust

[Sannon & Cosley 2019]



IIDR

mixed trust in IIDR

“They are ok; don’t know a lot about them” (P147, Robotext-Personalized)



high trust in Prolific

“I feel like Prolific weeds out all the bad studies so had faith that Prolifics would keep me safe” (P170, Robotext-Personalized)



# DISCUSSION

# Information flows


## Contextual integrity

Privacy: appropriate flows of information

Privacy harms: unexpected (re)use of data

## Privacy compartmentalization

Do actors need to be identified for behavior change?



# Implications for crowdwork

Crowdworker trust that platforms will help manage privacy


Need **privacy by design**:

- Requester identity verification

- Collaborations between IRBs and crowdwork platforms


- Purpose of data collection

## Directions for future work



### Strength of effect?

Single violation of contextual integrity not enough



### Competing effects?

Cautionary lesson: don't share data again

Demoralization: privacy hopelessness confirmed



### Other contexts?

Repeat with non-crowdworkers

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
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**CHI**  **May 2020**  
**2020**

- 1. Disclosure will continue despite hyper-personalization**
- 2. Self-regulation of privacy is insufficient**
- 3. Crowdworkers need improved privacy protections**

# BONUS SLIDES



## pre-study

prospective questions: American Housing Survey; US Census; Cosmopolitan magazine and Facebook quizzes; Pew Research surveys; group discussions

ideal question: consistent invasiveness across answer choices and quickly recallable answer


- “If given the opportunity, I would choose not to answer this question.” [Yes / No / Don’t Know]

tested with 63 pre-study participants on MTurk

chose set of 43 potentially invasive questions



# Personalized ads for single participants



## Part 2: following the ad...

General technology use questions to **prompt to look at phone**:

What is the current battery percentage of your phone?

If your phone doesn't show the exact battery percentage, please look at the battery indicator and estimate the amount.

## Part 2: other survey questions

Asked about...

opinions of personalized advertising

knowledge of Cambridge Analytica scandal

## part 1: elicit data

What is your first name?

Sophie

Hi Sophie. Which phone number should we use to contact you?

*You will receive up to 3 study-related text messages. Your phone number will be deleted from our records as soon as the study is complete.*

123-456-7890

## part 1: elicit data

In this section, you will see some questions about hypothetical everyday situations.

Imagine that you walked into a movie theater that was showing all of the following movies. Which would you be most likely to watch?

After

Hellboy

A Dark Place

Master Z: IP Man Legacy

Mia and the White Lion

Us

## part 1: elicit data

In this section, you will see some questions about hypothetical everyday situations.

Imagine that you walked into a movie theater that was showing all of the following movies. Which would you be most likely to watch?

After

Hellboy

A Dark Place

Master Z: IP Man Legacy

Mia and the White Lion

Us

## part 1: elicit data

Imagine that you're hungry and walking down a street with the following types of restaurants. Which would you be most likely to go to?

Italian

Thai

Indian

American

Japanese

**Mexican**

Chinese

## part 1: elicit data

In this section, you will see some questions about people in your life and their tech use.

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Think of a coworker you currently have or previously had.

What is their first name?




## part 1: elicit data

Think of your current significant other. If you do not currently have a significant other, think of someone you previously had a relationship with, or wish you were in a relationship with.

What is their name?

## part 2: deliver ad



## part 2: deliver ad

This is the first section of this survey. You will be asked questions about your general use of technology.

How many apps do you have on the main home screen of your phone?

What is the current battery percentage of your phone?

If your phone doesn't show the exact battery percentage, please look at the battery indicator and estimate the amount.

11-15

16-20

20 or more

My phone doesn't have a home screen

## part 2: measure disclosure

What did you eat for dinner last night?

Prefer not to say

Are you registered to vote at your current place of residence?

Yes

No


Prefer not to say

# personalization in advertising




demographics  
interests  
behaviors  
device info  
post engagement  
location

## The Markup



# personalization = privacy violation ?



***going online —> your data is collected***

## privacy calculus



## *privacy paradox*

in a variety of  
contexts, people  
acknowledge  
potential privacy  
implications but  
take no action